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Rule 14a-11 and the Administrative Procedure 
Act: It’s Better to Have Had and Waived, than 
Never to Have Had at All 
Reed T. Schuster∗ 
A dramatic sequence of events starting in the summer of 
2007 caused the United States’ banking and financial systems 
to collapse and thrust the country into the worst financial crisis 
since the Great Depression.1 It was not just one thing, but a 
confluence of factors that led to the collapse and the resultant 
crisis.2 Of particular note, though, commentators have pointed 
to risky lending coupled with inadequate personal savings,3 col-
lateralized debt obligations backed by subprime mortgages,4 
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 1. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 
AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, at vii (2009); see also Jon Hilsenrath, Se-
rena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since ’30s, with No End in Sight, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1. 
 2. See POSNER, supra note 1, at vii, 75–76. 
 3. Id. at 75; see also Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to Monitor Risk 
After Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153, 1153 (2010) (“Across the ideological 
spectrum, from Paul Krugman to Richard Posner and from Lucien [sic] Bebchuk 
to Stephen Bainbridge, commentators agree that one of the main causes of the 
financial crisis was that banks took on too much risk.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 4. See William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2009, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 424–26 (2010). Several commen-
tators have noted the important role that collateralized debt obligations 
played in the financial crisis. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: 
INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010) (discussing at length collateralized 
debt obligations and their role in causing the financial crisis); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 394–98 (2008) (discussing how the market 
for collateralized debt obligations backed by subprime mortgages affected oth-
er asset-backed securities). 
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and flawed economic and monetary policy5 as the driving forces 
of the crisis. The causes of the crisis, however, were not solely 
the underlying fundamentals of the market, but also its partic-
ipants. To be sure, chief executive officers (CEO) and other cor-
porate and institutional managers, whose recklessness and ex-
cessive risk taking allowed the crisis to burgeon, have taken 
the brunt of the criticism.6 But commentators have also at-
tacked boards of directors—tasked with overseeing some of the 
United States’ largest corporations—for failing to monitor 
closely the immoderation of corporate officers, and thereby let-
ting down the shareholders of U.S. corporations.7 The notion, 
however, that some boards do not satisfactorily govern their re-
spective corporations is not unique to the recent financial cri-
sis,8 nor is the idea that the prerogative of shareholders can be, 
and often is, ignored.9 Disney’s 2004 shareholder vote for its 
board of directors has become emblematic of this latter conten-
tion.10 
 
 5. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regu-
lation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 993 (2010) (stating that “sustained ultra-
low interest rates” were a contributing factor to the financial crisis). 
 6. See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Governmental Reform, 110th Cong. 12 
(2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve 
Board) (expressing “shocked disbelief ” in the actions of sophisticated market 
participants in the lead up to the financial crisis); Letter from Warren Buffett, 
Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc. 16 (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway 
.com/letters/2009ltr.pdf (castigating both corporate officers and directors for 
failing to control risk); Sam Gustin, As Berkshire Returns to Form, Buffett 
Blasts Wall Street, DAILYFINANCE.COM, (Feb. 27, 2010, 5:45 AM), http://www 
.dailyfinance.com/story/company-news/as-berkshire-returns-to-profitability-buffett 
-blasts-wall-stree/19376483/ (commenting on Buffett’s 2009 letter to Berkshire 
Hathaway’s shareholders). 
 7. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES 
KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 52 (2008) (arguing that the virtual plenary power of 
boards to manage the business and affairs of a corporation necessarily makes 
them the natural focus of inquiry during times of economic crisis). 
 8. See JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: 
THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 2 (1989) (contending that 
boards of directors, as much as corporate officers, were responsible for the “ob-
vious malaise” of business performance in the United States during the 1980s). 
 9. See, e.g., Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-Centered 
Corporation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 673 (2009) (describing the limita-
tions on shareholders’ powers). 
 10. See Tara L.C. Van Ho, Comment, Reconstructing the Marriage of 
Ownership and Control: Is the SEC Missing an Important Step in Its Hesitan-
cy to Adopt Proposed Rule 14a-11?, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2005). 
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Although he successfully brought Disney back from the 
brink of disaster in the 1980s, Michael Eisner, Disney’s CEO, 
thereafter engaged in ill-advised ventures and “obsessive mi-
cro-management,” which resulted in declining share prices and 
unhappy employees.11 In 2004, forty-three percent of Disney’s 
shareholders, in a previously unheard of show of dissent, 
“withheld” their votes from Eisner in the election for Disney’s 
board of directors.12 This percentage represented “an unambig-
uous message of unhappiness” with Eisner.13 Nevertheless, the 
board, unanimous in its support for Eisner, voted to retain him 
as CEO of the company.14 
Both the financial crisis and Disney’s example have re-
sulted in continued public demand for greater regulation and 
oversight of America’s corporate boardrooms.15 Efforts to in-
crease shareholder power over the corporations they own—
primarily through their votes on proxy statements at annual 
shareholder meetings—have thus been at the forefront of de-
bates on corporate governance.16 Taking a lead role in the de-
bate, on August 25, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) adopted Rule 14a-11.17 
The SEC, empowered by Congress under the Securities Act 
of 193318 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act),19 serves to protect investors against unscrupulous boards 
 
 11. Ronald Grover & Tom Lowry, Now It’s Time to Say Goodbye: How 
Disney’s Board Can Move Beyond the Eisner Era, BUS. WK., Mar. 15, 2004, at 
30, 31. 
 12. Van Ho, supra note 10, at 1211 (discussing the Disney shareholder 
vote). In a system of plurality voting, as Disney had, a candidate can win with 
less than fifty percent of the vote, and there is no option to vote “no.” Thus, 
shareholders, as a sign of dissent, “withhold” their vote for any particular can-
didate; Grover & Lowry, supra note 11, at 31. D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. 
WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 
462–63 (2008).  
 13. Grover & Lowry, supra note 11, at 31. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Letter from David Prystal to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 21, 
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s71707-30.htm. 
 16. Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder 
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) (arguing against increased share-
holder power), with Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Sharehold-
er Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing for greater shareholder power). 
 17. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77aa (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). 
 19. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). 
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of directors and corporate officers.20 Pursuant to its congres-
sional mandate, the SEC promulgated Rule 14a-11, which “re-
quire[s], under certain circumstances, a company’s proxy mate-
rials to provide shareholders with information about, and the 
ability to vote for, a shareholder’s, or group of shareholders’, 
nominees for director.”21 With certain conditions, the Rule ef-
fectively ends management’s monopoly over the corporate proxy 
statement.22  
The Rule also imposes on the states and unwilling majori-
ties of shareholders a mandatory federal scheme.23 Dubbed a 
“Mandatory Minimum Access Regime”24 by Professor Joseph 
Grundfest, the Rule permits shareholders to pass access stand-
ards that allow for greater access for shareholders to nominate 
directors, but condemns any shareholder effort to provide for 
less access.25 The Rule thus suggests that shareholders, though 
presumed to be sufficiently intelligent and responsible to nomi-
nate and elect their own directors, are not “sufficiently intelli-
gent and responsible . . . to determine whether proxy access 
should apply at any particular corporation.”26 Such a blatant 
contradiction, Grundfest and others argue, renders Rule 14a-11 
“arbitrary [and] capricious” under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA),27 and thus invalid.28 
 
 20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006). 
 21. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,668 
(stating that Rule 14a-11 “will require” a company to include qualifying 
shareholders’ nominees for the board). 
 22. Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, Int’l President, Am. Fed’n of State, 
Cnty. & Mun. Emps., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1 (Aug. 7, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-88.pdf. 
 23. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,673.  
 24. Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, 
Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 368 (2010) [hereinafter Grundfest, 
Proposed Proxy Access Rules]; see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Internal Contra-
dictions in the SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules 1 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate 
Governance, Working Paper No. 60, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1438308, attached to Letter from Joseph A. Grundfest, William A. 
Franke Professor of Law & Bus., Stanford Law Sch., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, SEC (July 24, 2009), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/ 
s71009-64.pdf [hereinafter Grundfest, Internal Contradictions]. 
 25. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,680 
(“[W]e are not persuaded that we should allow our rules to be altered by 
shareholders or boards to the potential detriment of other shareholders.”). 
 26. Grundfest, Proposed Proxy Access Rules, supra note 24, at 370. 
 27. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (“[T]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlaw-
ful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbi-
trary [and] capricious . . . .”). 
 28. See Grundfest, Proposed Proxy Access Rules, supra note 24, at 364. 
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This Note advocates for a different interpretation of Rule 
14a-11 and argues that the Rule is not inherently contradictory 
and thus not arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Part I of 
this Note sets forth the historical and legal background behind 
the enactment of Rule 14a-11. Part II dissects the case for in-
creasing shareholder rights and analyzes Rule 14a-11 under 
common-law arbitrary and capricious standards. Finally, Part 
III proposes a judicial resolution in favor of Rule 14a-11 or, in 
the alternative, urges that the SEC amend the Rule to include 
parameters within which shareholders can tailor the level of 
access that is most beneficial to their respective corporations. 
I.  THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE   
Issues of corporate governance29 have been at the forefront 
of corporate law for years.30 Most contentious is the debate 
about the role shareholders should play in framing and influen-
cing the business and affairs of America’s largest corpora-
tions.31 The SEC recently turned up the heat in this debate by 
adopting Rule 14a-11.32 This Part discusses the issues and law 
surrounding the debate in three sections. First, it looks at the 
ever-increasing divide between ownership and control in the 
modern corporation and its effects on corporate governance. 
Second, this Part addresses the SEC’s promulgation of proxy 
rules pursuant to its congressional mandate and the role of 
those rules in the current debate. Finally, this Part looks at 
Rule 14a-11 and its relation to the APA’s arbitrary and capri-
cious standard. 
A. THE DIVIDE BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means examined the di-
vision between the ownership and management of American 
 
 29. Corporate governance, though a “hefty-sounding phrase,” simply con-
cerns the “oversight of a company’s management.” Judith Burns, Corporate 
Governance (A Special Report)—Everything You Wanted to Know About Corpo-
rate Governance . . . But Didn’t Know to Ask, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R6. 
 30. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 31. See generally James McConvill, Shareholder Empowerment as an End 
in Itself: A New Perspective on Allocation of Power in the Modern Corporation, 
33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1013 (2007) (discussing at length the debate over the 
costs and benefits of increased shareholder empowerment). 
 32. Cf. Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nomi-
nations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 260–61 (2005) (discuss-
ing the debate surrounding the SEC’s 2003 proposal of Rule 14a-11). 
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corporations.33 Berle and Means’s data demonstrated two 
truths. First, the modern corporation of the twentieth century 
was no longer the “mom-and-pop” business of the nineteenth 
century, but rather had become a complex entity composed of 
thousands of workers and extensive property holdings worth 
millions of dollars.34 Second, ownership was not concentrated in 
a single individual, but rather belonged to a diffuse network of 
shareholders.35 Relying on these two findings, Berle and Means 
concluded that control of the corporation would inevitably di-
verge away from the owners and towards centralized manage-
ment.36 Shareholders, in effect, accepted ownership of the cor-
poration’s stock, but gave up the right to control the direction of 
that property.37 Shareholders, therefore, have come to possess 
“passive property,” and are thus passive investors, having 
ceded control of the corporation to the board of directors.38  
The board’s power to manage the business and affairs of 
the corporation is almost plenary.39 In Delaware, the leading 
source of corporate law in the United States,40 “a cardinal pre-
cept of [corporate law] is that directors, rather than sharehold-
ers, manage the business and affairs of the corporations.”41 
 
 33. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 34. See id. at 2–3 (contrasting small businesses of the nineteenth century 
with the “great aggregations” of wealth and property of corporations at the 
turn of the century). 
 35. See id. at 3 (describing the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, which had over 500,000 shareholders at that time). 
 36. Id. at 6. 
 37. See Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder 
Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. 
L. REV. 379, 384 (1994). 
 38. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 33, at 346–47; see also Goforth, supra 
note 37, at 384 (summarizing Berle and Means’s arguments). 
 39. Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 616 (“In U.S. corporate law, shareholder 
control rights in fact are so weak that they scarcely qualify as part of corporate 
governance.”); Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation 
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1312 (2009). 
 40. E.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATION 
FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 873 (3d ed. 2001) (“Delaware . . . is the prin-
cipal architect and steward of a ‘national corporation law’ since it is the domi-
cile of over 180,000 corporations . . . .” (quoting E. Norman Veasey et al., The 
Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strategies and Comparisons, 43 BUS. 
LAW. 865, 866 (1988))). 
 41. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); see also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009) (“The business and affairs of every corporation or-
ganized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors . . . .”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In 
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Similarly, the Model Business Corporation Act, adopted by 
roughly half the states,42 provides the board of directors with 
nearly absolute power to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation.43 Adding an additional layer, courts have taken a 
very deferential stance towards boards’ power to make business 
decisions.44 The business judgment rule, first instituted nearly 
two centuries ago,45 cautions courts to exercise restraint in 
second-guessing a board’s business decision.46 Simply stated, 
the rule provides a “presumption that in making a business de-
cision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was 
in the best interests of the company.”47 Justified, in part, on the 
ground of keeping judges inexperienced in business from inter-
fering,48 the rule effectively clothes boards of directors with vir-
tually unlimited power to steer corporations in whatever direc-
tions they see fit.49 
There are inherent difficulties associated with the stark 
divide between shareholder ownership and director control in 
the modern corporation. Of great concern is the possible devo-
lution of the long-established “shareholder primacy” norm50—
namely, the notion that directors are to make decisions in the 
 
re Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders’ Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 41–42 (Del. 1993) 
(“[It is a] fundamental principle that the management of the business and af-
fairs of a Delaware corporation is entrusted to its directors, who are the duly 
elected and authorized representatives of the stockholders.”). 
 42. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder 
Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 63 (2008). 
 43. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2002). 
 44. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 
(Del. 2003) (“The business judgment rule embodies the deference that is ac-
corded to managerial decisions of a board of directors.”). 
 45. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 78 (La. 1829) (“The test of re-
sponsibility therefore should be, not the certainty of wisdom in others, but the 
possession of ordinary knowledge; and by shewing that the error of the agent 
is of so gross a kind, that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, 
would not have fallen into it.”). 
 46. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278–79 (1st ed. 2000) 
(discussing the rationale underlying the business judgment rule). 
 47. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) 
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 48. SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 502. 
 49. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974) (holding 
that the business judgment rule starts with a presumption in the board’s favor). 
 50. See Usha Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing: The Case for 
Reuniting Ownership and Control, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 254, 254–55 
(2004) (questioning whether boards always work to serve the interests of 
shareholders). 
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interests of the shareholders.51 Unfortunately, because share-
holders cannot expect the management of the modern corpora-
tion to monitor their property “with the same anxious vigi-
lance” that private partners would their own,52 the difficulty 
becomes more apparent. 
B. THE AMERICAN PROXY SYSTEM 
Recognizing these difficulties, Congress enacted the Ex-
change Act53 in an effort to provide more and better informa-
tion to shareholders so they can assert control over the corpora-
tions they own.54 Generally, the Exchange Act seeks to prevent 
corporations from misleading shareholders by mandating that 
boards of directors provide a greater degree of disclosure in an-
nual proxy statements.55 More specifically, section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act, in light of the ever-increasing diffusion of share-
holders,56 authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules for share-
holder voting by proxy.57  
The rules promulgated under section 14(a) and adopted by 
the SEC have sought to institutionalize shareholders’ voting 
rights.58 Long understood by Congress as an important right,59 
 
 51. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”); 
see also John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm 
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1327 
(1992) (“The traditional shareholder primacy model of the corporation derives 
from the concept that the shareholders are the owners of the corporation and, 
as such, are entitled to control it, determine its fundamental policies, and de-
cide whether to make fundamental shifts in corporate policy and practice.”). 
 52. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1965); see 
also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 33, at 345–46 (commenting on Smith’s ar-
gument). 
 53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (cur-
rent version codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). 
 54. See id. at 895; see also GEVURTZ, supra note 46, at 242 (contending 
that it is not a coincidence that Congress passed the Securities Act and Ex-
change Act two years after Berle and Means authored The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property). 
 55. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 
(1963) (“A fundamental purpose [of the Exchange Act] . . . was to substitute a 
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor . . . .”). 
 56. See Fairfax, supra note 42, at 60 (commenting on the need for proxy 
votes to take into account the widely dispersed nature of public shareholders). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2006). 
 58. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2008) (outlining the information to be 
furnished to shareholders in a proxy statement). 
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the SEC wanted to formalize those rights and thereby erase the 
“monarchial [and] aristocratic” climate of U.S. corporate board-
rooms.60 The SEC’s purpose in establishing shareholders’ vot-
ing power was twofold: to give shareholders a direct say in elec-
tions, and to give shareholders an indirect influence over 
director behavior, thereby increasing the chances that directors 
would listen to shareholder concerns when making business de-
cisions.61 In effect, the SEC hoped to imbue shareholders with 
greater control over the corporations they own, allowing them 
to play a greater role in the decisionmaking process.62 The 
proxy rules, unfortunately, failed to achieve this goal.63 In-
stead, the SEC left boards with significant power to control the 
direction of their corporations: the power to be effectively the 
sole guardians of the director nomination process.64 
Proxy Rule 14a-4(b)(2) outlines the form of proxy necessary 
for the election of directors.65 It plainly states that the proxy 
“shall set forth the names of persons nominated for election as 
directors.”66 The issue is that the proxy rules do not require the 
names of all candidates for the board to be on a corporation’s 
proxy statement, but only those candidates whom the releasing 
party—the corporation—supports.67 The board can choose to 
include shareholders’ nominees for director,68 but boards rarely 
do so.69 Thus, shareholders must resort to the few measures 
available to them in the rules to nominate their own candidates 
or effectuate board action. 
 
 59. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 14 (1934). 
 60. Id. at 5. 
 61. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. 
L.J. 1259, 1261 (2009). 
 62. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 14. 
 63. See Goforth, supra note 37, at 388. 
 64. See id.; see also Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest 
Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 19 (1992) (“Although shareholders have the 
right to elect directors, the federal proxy rules do not permit shareholders to 
nominate them for inclusion in the corporation’s proxy statement.”). 
 65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (2010). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See GEVURTZ, supra note 46, at 247–48 (rejecting the proposition that 
a proxy statement is analogous to a ballot in a democratic election, preferring 
to liken it instead to an old Soviet Union ballot in which electors would simply 
vote yes or no to the Communist Party’s nominated candidate). 
 68. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Revisited, 
40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 38 (1990) (noting that boards or nominating commit-
tees may, but are not required to, include shareholders’ nominees). 
 69. McDonnell, supra note 32, at 211. 
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Under the proxy rules and corporate law, there are at least 
three available mechanisms for shareholders to bring into ef-
fect board action in this area. Shareholders may take the so-
called Wall Street Walk;70 engage in a proxy contest to submit 
their own proxy to the shareholders;71 or submit a bylaw 
amendment proposal that requires the board to include share-
holder nominees in the corporation’s proxy materials.72 None of 
these measures has proven successful in increasing sharehold-
ers’ rights to nominate their own slate of candidates. 
First, the Wall Street Walk, or the Wall Street rule, essen-
tially holds that shareholders can “vote with their feet” by sell-
ing their stock when they are dissatisfied with a board’s deci-
sions.73 There are evident problems with the Wall Street rule, 
however. Broadly speaking, the Wall Street rule overlooks “the 
fact that it leads to high turnover of stock ownership.”74 Such 
turnover has two effects: it fosters increased unpredictability in 
the capital markets and it forces management to focus on short-
term profits, as opposed to better quality long-term results.75 
More narrowly, the Wall Street rule does nothing for individual 
shareholders seeking to change corporate governance schemes 
or nominate a director.76 
Second, shareholders can nominate their own slate of di-
rectors by engaging in a proxy contest.77 Commentators have 
generally defined a proxy contest as a “struggle between two or 
more opposing groups for minority representation or majority 
control of a corporation’s board of directors through the solicita-
tion of proxies.”78 To engage in a proxy contest, a shareholder, 
unlike an incumbent whose costs are fully borne by the corpo-
ration, must assume enormous procedural expense.79 At the 
least, a shareholder must pay to prepare a proxy statement, 
 
 70. See Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street 
Talk: The Changing Face of Corporate Governance, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 43, 
46 (1998). 
 71. See McDonnell, supra note 32, at 211. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Van Ho, supra note 10, at 1220. 
 74. Goforth, supra note 37, at 407. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 
VA. L. REV. 675, 716 (2007). 
 77. HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 40, at 762–63. 
 78. DOUGLAS V. AUSTIN, PROXY CONTESTS AND CORPORATE REFORM 3 
(1965) (emphasis omitted). 
 79. Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 856; Bebchuk, supra note 76, at 688–89 
(discussing the costs associated with a proxy contest). 
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mail each proxy card to individual shareholders, and defend 
against the incumbents’ legal challenges to the accuracy or 
completeness of the proxy statement.80 These costs, most nota-
bly in the case of large corporations, can force a shareholder to 
pay hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars.81 Conse-
quently, proxy contests are exceedingly rare,82 and commenta-
tors generally consider them less preferable than other meas-
ures.83 
Finally, a more practical mechanism for shareholders to 
nominate directors or influence corporate governance is 
through a proxy access bylaw governed, in part, by Rule 14a-
8.84 A proxy access bylaw allows a shareholder to keep her 
shares and removes the cost barrier of a proxy contest.85 Not 
surprisingly, this is the preferred method to effectuate share-
holders’ voting rights.86 Additionally, a bylaw proposal, lacking 
the aforementioned cost barrier, allows a much broader spec-
trum of shareholders to participate in shaping corporate af-
fairs.87 Under proxy Rule 14a-8, a shareholder may submit a 
bylaw amendment proposal to the board for inclusion in the 
proxy statement.88 Assuming the shareholder meets certain 
specified conditions, the board is required to include the bylaw 
proposal in the corporation’s annual proxy statement.89 Rule 
14a-8(i) further delineates thirteen instances in which a bylaw 
proposal’s substantive nature may violate the Rule.90 
Of particular note, Rule 14a-8(i)(8) permits a company to 
exclude a bylaw proposal if it “relates to a nomination or an 
 
 80. See Bebchuk, supra note 76, at 688. 
 81. See id. at 688–89 (citing the proxy contest at Six Flags in 2006, in 
which the insurgent spent roughly $850,000 on preparing and mailing proxy 
statements and associated legal fees); Battling for Corporate America, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 70 (discussing the costs associated with engag-
ing in a proxy contest). 
 82. See Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 856 (citing a study the author con-
ducted in which he found, between 1996 and 2002, an average of only eleven 
proxy contests a year among the thousands of public companies). 
 83. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 
95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1403 (2007). 
 84. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). 
 85. Fairfax, supra note 61, at 1267–68. 
 86. Id. at 1267. 
 87. See id. at 1267–68. 
 88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
 89. See McDonnell, supra note 32, at 211. 
 90. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)–(13). 
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election for membership on the company’s board of directors.”91 
Facially, it appears the Rule effectively nullifies shareholders’ 
efforts to approve a bylaw proposal seeking access to the corpo-
ration’s proxy statement to nominate directors.92 The SEC has 
largely adopted this view, and generally has permitted corpora-
tions to exclude proxy access bylaws that seek to enlarge 
shareholders’ nominating powers.93 Though the SEC for a brief 
period intimated that it would allow such proposals,94 it quickly 
reversed course and reiterated its opposition to them.95 As 
such, proxy access bylaws seeking to allow shareholders the 
power to nominate directors were seemingly a dead issue.96 
The Second Circuit reinvigorated the shareholder nomi-
nation debate in American Federation of State, County & Mu-
nicipal Employees (AFSCME) v. American International Group, 
Inc. (AIG).97 In that case, AFSCME, one of the largest public-
service-employee unions in the United States, submitted to AIG 
for inclusion in its proxy statement a shareholder proposal that 
would alter AIG’s bylaws to require shareholder-nominated 
candidates to be on the company’s proxy ballot.98 AIG sought 
the approval of the SEC to exclude the proposal from its proxy 
statement under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) on the basis that it “relates to 
an election.”99 The SEC responded with a no-action letter sup-
porting exclusion by AIG.100 AIG summarily excluded the pro-
 
 91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8). 
 92. See Jay Razzouk, The Momentum, Motive, and Mouse-Kapades of the 
Majority Vote Movement, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 391, 415 (2008) 
(“Given this vague language, it would seem that a board could exclude any 
shareholder proposal dealing with director elections . . . .”). 
 93. See McDonnell, supra note 32, at 211. 
 94. See, e.g., The Walt Disney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 
2848301, at *1 (Dec. 8, 2004). For a discussion of the Walt Disney No-Action 
Letter, see McDonnell, supra note 32, at 212. 
 95. McDonnell, supra note 32, at 212; see also Fairfax, supra note 42, at 
74 (discussing the SEC’s “return to the status quo” by strictly limiting share-
holders’ access to the corporate ballot). 
 96. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance and Share-
holder Access to the Board Room, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339, 1365 (commenting 
that before 2006 “[t]he proposal for shareholder access remained officially out-
standing but effectively dead”). 
 97. 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Fairfax, supra note 42, at 74–75 
(noting that AFSCME “breathed new life” into the issue of shareholders’ power 
to nominate directors).  
 98. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 123–24. 
 99. AIG, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 372266, at *4 (Feb. 14, 2005).  
 100. Id. at *1. 
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posal from its proxy statement; in response, AFSCME filed suit 
in federal court.101 
The Second Circuit, hearing the case on appeal from the 
Southern District of New York,102 reversed the lower court and 
mandated inclusion of the proxy-access bylaw.103 In so holding, 
the court emphasized the publication of two informal, conflict-
ing interpretations of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) by the SEC.104 The first, 
published in 1976, contended that “a proposal may be excluded 
pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) if it would result in an immediate 
election contest.”105 The second, set forth in the SEC’s amicus 
brief to the Second Circuit, argued that a company may exclude 
a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) if it might result in a con-
tested election.106 Acknowledging the conflict, the court rejected 
the SEC’s more recent statement on the grounds that such con-
flicting interpretations result in less judicial deference to the 
rulemaking authority107 and that the SEC failed to offer a rea-
soned analysis or even an explanation for its change in inter-
pretation.108 In affirming that the SEC’s 1976 statement was 
the correct one, the court held that a company may only ex-
clude a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) if it results in an imme-
diate election contest.109 In drawing this conclusion, the court 
distinguished between a shareholder proposal that would result 
in an immediate election contest and a proposal that “simply 
establish[es] a process for shareholders to wage a future elec-
tion contest.”110 
The SEC’s response to the Second Circuit’s ruling has only 
led to further confusion.111 Soon after AFSCME, the SEC an-
nounced that it would revise Rule 14a-8 to “assure its consist-
 
 101. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 124. 
 102. AFSCME v. AIG, 361 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 462 F.3d 
121 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 103. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 129–30. 
 104. Id. at 126. 
 105. Id. at 127 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Proposals by Security Holders, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,982, 29,985 (proposed July 
20, 1976). 
 106. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 126. 
 107. Id. at 129 (“[T]he SEC . . . has a ‘duty to explain its departure from 
prior norms.’” (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of 
Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973))). 
 108. Id.; see also Fairfax, supra note 61, at 1276. 
 109. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 127. 
 110. Id. at 128. 
 111. See Fairfax, supra note 42, at 75. 
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ent nationwide application.”112 Nonetheless, when another case 
presented an issue nearly identical to the issue in AFSCME, 
the SEC expressed no preference about whether the company 
may exclude the shareholder nomination proposal.113 Six 
months later, the SEC spoke on the issue of proxy access, but 
with two conflicting proposals.114 The first established a proce-
dure enabling shareholders to include in company proxy mate-
rials “proposals for bylaw amendments regarding the proce-
dures for nominating candidates to the board of directors.”115 
The second provided that “shareholder proposals that could re-
sult in an election contest may be excluded under Rule 14a-
8(i)(8).”116 In 2007, the SEC adopted the latter proposal.117 
C. RULE 14A-11 AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
In light of the ensuing confusion, the SEC responded with 
Rule 14a-11, which effectively gives, with certain conditions, 
shareholders access to a company’s proxy materials to nomi-
nate their own directors. The Rule has two working parts. 
First, it would amend Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to preclude companies 
from relying on that rule to exclude shareholder proposals seek-
ing to amend a company’s governing documents regarding di-
rector nomination procedures.118 Second, the Rule requires 
companies, under certain circumstances, to “provide sharehold-
ers with information about, and the ability to vote for, a share-
holder’s . . . nominees for director in the companies’ proxy ma-
terials.”119 The most notable condition is that a shareholder 
seeking to invoke Rule 14a-11 must “not hold the securities 
with the purpose, or with the effect, of changing the control of 
 
 112. Press Release, SEC, Commission Calendars Proposed Amendment to 
Rule 14a-8 Governing Director Nominations by Shareholders (Sept. 7, 2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-150.htm. 
 113. See Hewlett-Packard Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 224970, at 
*1 (Jan. 22, 2007). 
 114. Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007); 
Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. 
43,488 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007); see also Fairfax, supra note 42, at 77–78 (dis-
cussing the two conflicting proposals). 
 115. Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,466. 
 116. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. 
Reg. at 43,491. 
 117. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8). 
 118. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,677 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 119. Id. 
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the company or gaining more than a limited number of seats on 
the board.”120 Thus, the Rule does not permit a shareholder or 
group of shareholders to take over the board, but simply pro-
vides shareholders with a more meaningful tool to influence 
their corporations’ governing structures. 
One of the Rule’s more controversial provisions is that 
shareholders cannot enact more stringent standards for access 
to a company’s proxy materials, but only standards that are 
more lenient.121 Commentators have argued that the Rule, for 
this reason alone, is invalid under the APA’s arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard.122 
Section 706(2)(A) of title 5 of the U.S. Code mandates 
courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary [and] capricious.”123 
Often referred to as “hard look” review,124 this standard, and 
the congressional intent behind it, has always generated de-
bate.125 As such, the courts’ application of such review has 
changed considerably over time.126  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in 2009 iterated its com-
mitment to a deferential standard of review consistent with its 
earlier precedent.127 Under this standard, an agency must only 
acknowledge the change in its policy,128 “‘examine the relevant 
data[,] and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its ac-
 
 120. Id. at 56,699. 
 121. Id. at 56,680. 
 122. See Grundfest, Internal Contradictions, supra note 24, at 2 (arguing 
that the contradictions in Rule 14a-11 are “sufficiently material” that the Rule 
would be unlikely to withstand scrutiny under the APA). 
 123. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
 124. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbi-
trariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761 (2008) (“The doctrine . . . re-
quire[s] administrative agencies to demonstrate that they [have] taken a ‘hard 
look’ at the underlying questions of policy and fact.”). 
 125. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 56 (1988) (“There has always been some debate 
about what th[e] words [arbitrary and capricious] mean.”). 
 126. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and 
Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 15 (2009). Compare Nat’l Broad. Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215–19 (1943) (taking a very deferential stance 
towards administrative rulemaking), with Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–49 (1983) (requiring a heightened 
review of an administrative regulation).  
 127. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009). 
 128. Id. at 1811 (“To be sure, the requirement that an agency provide rea-
soned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display 
awareness that it is changing position.”). 
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tion.’”129 In other words, the agency must explicate “good rea-
sons” for the new policy130 by establishing a “rational connec-
tion between the facts found and the choice made.”131 Described 
as a sort of “lunacy test,” a court should only reject an agency 
rule “if no reasonable person could have written [it].”132 In ap-
plying the test, a court may not substitute its own judgment for 
that of the agency and should uphold agency action, even one 
that is not of ideal clarity, as long as the court can reasonably 
discern the agency’s reasoning.133 
In light of the foregoing discussion, Part II evaluates Rule 
14a-11 in the context of the reality of modern corporations and 
the Rule’s ability to withstand judicial scrutiny under the APA. 
II.  THE CASE FOR INCREASING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
AND THE VALIDITY OF RULE 14A-11 UNDER THE 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD   
Because Rule 14a-11 departs from the SEC’s previous un-
derstanding of proxy access, detractors will likely challenge the 
Rule on the basis that it is arbitrary and capricious under the 
APA.134 This Part discusses and analyzes two distinct aspects 
of the issue. The first section addresses the question of whether 
enlarged shareholder rights are a legitimate goal as a matter of 
necessity and prudence. The second analyzes three aspects of 
Rule 14a-11 under the common-law understanding of arbitrary 
and capricious review. 
 
 129. Id. at 1810 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). 
 130. Id. at 1811. 
 131. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 132. SHAPIRO, supra note 125, at 56. 
 133. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-
Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). 
 134. These complaints have already begun. See Petition for Review at 2, 
Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2010); see also 
Brief in Support of Motion for Stay of Proxy Access Rules by Business Round-
table and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America at 2–8, Bus. 
Roundtable v. U.S. SEC, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2010). Soon after the 
Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce filed their Petition for 
Review, the SEC issued an Order Granting Stay, effectively staying enforce-
ment of Rule 14a-11 and the amendment to Rule 14a-8 pending resolution of 
the Petition for Review by the D.C. Circuit. Order Granting Stay, In the Mat-
ter of the Motion of Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America, for Stay of Effect of Commission’s Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nomination Rules, File No. S7-10-09, available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9149.pdf. 
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A. THE CASE FOR INCREASING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
Although Berle and Means successfully documented and 
predicted the new economic realities associated with the divi-
sion between ownership and control of corporations,135 they 
failed to speak about whether shareholders in this new era 
should have the requisite control to influence substantive is-
sues of corporate governance. More specifically, they neglected 
to address whether the law should allow a shareholder—in 
some instances, just one of hundreds of thousands of share-
holders—to vote on the minutiae of corporate governance mat-
ters. 
A number of corporate law scholars and commentators 
have alleged that greater shareholder power to nominate direc-
tors will have deleterious effects on America’s corporations.136 
Two such arguments are of particular note. First, some schol-
ars contend that boards of directors exhibit a greater capacity 
than shareholders to run a corporation in an efficient and prof-
itable manner.137 Second, other commentators maintain that 
greater shareholder power will work to benefit only large spe-
cial-interest shareholders, such as public pension funds, who 
will use such power in a way that is not beneficial to share-
holders in the aggregate.138 Both arguments, though highlight-
ing possible imperfections in shareholders’ power to nominate 
directors, do not override the inherent benefits associated with 
greater shareholder influence in this area. 
First, a number of commentators have expressed the con-
cern that shareholders’ ability to nominate directors could im-
pede the proper functioning of a board and consequently cause 
 
 135. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 33, at 119–25; id. at 352 (“Most fun-
damental to the new picture of economic life must be a new concept of business 
enterprise concentrated in the corporate organization.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Paul Atkins, Op-Ed., The SEC’s Sop to Unions, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 27, 2010, at A15 (“[Rule 14a-11] will give [unions and cause-driven, mi-
nority shareholders] pressure points with which to hold companies hostage 
until their pet issues are addressed.”); Thomas J. Donohue, SEC Proxy Plan Is 
a Threat to Business, Boon to Labor, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 4, 2003, at 
A14 (“The Securities and Exchange Commission[’s] . . . unfortunate [Rule 14a-
11] proposal . . . could seriously impair the competitiveness of America’s best 
companies . . . and needlessly complicate corporate governance issues . . . .”).  
 137. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 81–89 (1991). 
 138. See, e.g., Christopher J. Smart, Takeover Dangers and Non-
Shareholders: Who Should Be Our Brothers’ Keeper?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 301, 317 (discussing the threat of institutional investors’ use of power in 
a way that is unacceptable to the general public). 
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inefficiencies in corporate decisionmaking.139 Henry G. Manne, 
the first legal commentator to analyze the corporate form from 
an economic perspective,140 argued that the corporate form ef-
fectively assumes a centralized form of management in the 
board of directors.141 For that reason, limits as to what share-
holders could vote on were wholly consistent with the economic 
function of corporations.142 Others have gone further and ar-
gued that investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking 
would likely upset the “hierarchical decisionmaking structure” 
that is well suited to the corporate form, and would consequent-
ly lead to inefficient management.143 Furthermore, critics 
charge that a firm, to appease certain constituencies, may 
adopt a more moral or socially desirable strategy in lieu of one 
that maximizes profit through more efficient decisionmaking by 
a board.144 
Other scholarly criticism has focused on shareholders’ 
competency and their general apathy towards corporate af-
fairs.145 A number of critics, even some proponents, have ex-
pressed concerns about shareholders’ competency.146 One such 
concern is that the vast number of shareholders, even large in-
stitutional investors, hold such highly diversified portfolios that 
it would be illogical for them to focus on any one particular cor-
poration.147 The above views, however, fail to consider the sig-
nificant gains in corporate governance shareholders have 
 
 139. E.g., Letter from David T. Hirschmann, Senior Vice President, Cham-
ber of Commerce of the United States, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 10 (Oct. 
2, 2007), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-482.pdf. 
 140. Peter V. Letsou, Shareholder Voice and the Market for Corporate Con-
trol, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 774 (1992). 
 141. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 
53 VA. L. REV. 259, 260–61 (1967) (“The first important legal norm which can 
be derived from the central concept of the corporation as a capital-raising de-
vice is that of centralized management . . . .”). 
 142. Letsou, supra note 140, at 774. 
 143. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempow-
erment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1749 (2006). 
 144. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 137, at 85 (“[T]he proposal [to 
increase shareholder influence], because of the publicity generated or other-
wise, causes the firm to abandon a profit-maximizing strategy in favor of one 
that some find more ‘moral’ or ‘socially responsible.’”). 
 145. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 7, at 199; Daniel R. Fischel, The Corpo-
rate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1274–75 (1982) (“[M]ost 
shareholders have little interest in running the corporation’s affairs.”). 
 146. See Fairfax, supra note 61, at 1269–70; Fischel, supra note 145, at 
1274–75. 
 147. See MACEY, supra note 7, at 199.  
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achieved in light of the recent corporate scandals and financial 
crisis. 
Patrick McGurn, senior vice president and special counsel 
at Institutional Shareholder Services, stated that “poor govern-
ance is a substantial risk factor” for shareholders.148 After 
Enron and the more recent financial crisis, shareholders have 
recognized this risk and have demonstrated a greater desire to 
engage in corporate governance decisions.149 For instance, in 
2007, forty-three percent of Hewlett Packard’s shareholders 
voted in favor of a proxy access proposal.150 Some commenta-
tors argued that such a percentage, which was insufficient to 
approve the proposal, does not support the proposition that 
shareholders are now more willing to engage in corporate gov-
ernance issues.151 But these critics fail to acknowledge that for-
ty-three percent represents a significant achievement for a 
shareholder proposal. In the past, commentators considered a 
shareholder proposal successful if it garnered as little as five 
percent of the vote.152 Moreover, recent data show shareholders 
are voting in higher numbers, differentiating among the issues 
presented to them, and organizing as a collective body at a 
much greater rate.153 Thus, the reforms presented in Rule 14a-
11 would arguably serve only to increase these gains, thereby 
generating even greater involvement by shareholders in corpo-
rate governance issues. 
Second, some critics have maintained that greater proxy 
access may prove ineffective as a means to empower sharehold-
ers generally.154 Instead, these critics argue that greater proxy 
access will entrench power in large institutional investors that 
 
 148. Burns, supra note 29, at R6. 
 149. See Rose A. Zukin, Comment, We Talk, You Listen: Should Sharehold-
ers’ Voices Be Heard or Stifled When Nominating Directors? How the Proposed 
Shareholder Director Nomination Rule Will Contribute to Restoring Proper 
Corporate Governance, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 937, 940 (2006) (noting shareholders’ 
demands for a greater role in corporate governance). 
 150. H. Bryan Brewer, Proxy Season 2007: More Smoke than Fire, FIN. 
EXECUTIVE, July 1, 2007, at 18, available at 2007 WLNR 26769230. 
 151. See Bainbridge, supra note 143, at 1751 (“[I]t is improbable that dis-
persed individual investors with small holdings will ever be anything other 
than rationally apathetic . . . .”). 
 152. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 137, at 83. 
 153. See Barnard, supra note 68, at 80. 
 154. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1157–68 (1993) (discussing the divergent behavior, 
interests, and regulation of institutional investors). 
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will advance their own narrow and selfish interests.155 For in-
stance, proposals that are beneficial to labor unions, such as 
rights desired by union fund managers, may not be, and often 
will not be, for the benefit or even in the best interest of share-
holders generally.156  
This argument is problematic for at least two reasons. 
First, nothing suggests that the interests of institutional inves-
tors inevitably run counter to those of shareholders.157 For in-
stance, on at least two occasions AFSCME sought to include 
proposals that served the interests of all shareholders.158 
Second, evidence suggests that institutional investors have 
been, and continue to be, largely inactive and ineffective as 
corporate monitors.159 Though in the early 1990s institutional 
investors played a more active role in corporate governance 
than they had previously, their effect on governance leading in-
to the new century remained negligible.160 Furthermore, evi-
dence also suggests that these efforts had meager effects on 
 
 155. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 143, at 1751 (contending that large 
institutional investors are the shareholders most likely to misuse their powers 
for private gains); Atkins, supra note 136, at A15 (“[U]nions and cause-driven, 
minority shareholders . . . would use [Rule 14a-11] to advance their own labor, 
social and environmental agendas instead of the corporation’s goal of maximiz-
ing long-term shareholder wealth.”); Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, State-
ment at Open Meeting to Propose Amendments Regarding Facilitating Share-
holder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.htm (“[W]e need to be mindful that proxy 
access might privilege certain shareholders at the expense of others.”). 
 156. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Ac-
tivism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 
174, 231 (2001) (discussing institutional investors’ and shareholders’ some-
times divergent priorities). 
 157. See Fairfax, supra note 61, at 1271–72. 
 158. See AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2006) (ruling in favor 
of an AFSCME bylaw proposal that required the corporation to include share-
holder-nominated candidates for election to the board); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME 
Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (ruling against an 
AFSCME bylaw amendment that required reimbursement of shareholder ex-
penses incurred in nominating candidates for election to the board).  
 159. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 203–09 (2008) (discussing the passivity of institutional 
shareholders and the reasons behind it). 
 160. See Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 629 (noting institutional investors’ 
somewhat surprising lack of activity as investor activists); Bernard S. Black, 
Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 460 (Peter 
Newman ed., 1998) (“Even the most activist institutions spend less than half a 
basis point of assets under management (0.005%) per year on their governance 
efforts.”). 
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firm performance and practices.161 Thus, as presumably ration-
al actors seeking to maximize profits, many institutional inves-
tors would be ill-served by expending costs in excess of such 
fleeting benefits.162 Accordingly, despite anecdotal evidence to 
the contrary,163 it does not appear that greater shareholder 
access to proxy statements would result in significant abuse by 
large institutional investors. 
Beyond the arguments against greater shareholder access, 
increased shareholder power can serve as a boon to corpora-
tions. For instance, a board consisting of homogeneous, constit-
uent directors is more apt to exhibit “groupthink” tendencies.164 
In this situation, boards will often abandon alternative courses 
of action in an effort to instill cohesiveness and attain unanimi-
ty in board decisions.165 Rule 14a-11 works to put in place di-
rectors who are independent from the board’s constituents and 
who, therefore, can provide different points of view.166 Although 
shareholder-nominated directors will not eliminate groupthink, 
the risk is reduced because such directors are not beholden to 
the CEO or other corporate officers.167 
 
 161. Black, supra note 160, at 459. 
 162. Bainbridge, supra note 143, at 1752 (“Most institutional investors are 
profit maximizers, who will not engage in activities whose costs exceed their 
benefits.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder 
Access Proposal 12–13 (Univ. of Cal., L.A. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research 
Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=470121 (“If the 
board becomes more beholden to the interests of large shareholders, it may 
become less concerned with the welfare of smaller investors.”). 
 164. Barnard, supra note 68, at 76 (remarking on the higher tendency of 
“groupthink” in homogeneous boards); see also James D. Cox & Harry L. Mun-
singer, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implica-
tions of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 91–99 (1985) 
(analyzing the homogeneity of corporate board make up and concluding that 
“powerful psychological factors are at work within the boardroom, creating a 
cohesive, loyal, conforming ingroup that will support its members for positive 
and negative reasons”). 
 165. See Barnard, supra note 68, at 76 (“‘Groupthink’ is . . . when the 
members’ striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically ap-
praise alternative courses of action.”). 
 166. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Bal-
lot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 63 (2003) (supporting the then-proposed SEC Rule 14a-
11 because of the effect “independent directors” would have on corporate per-
formance). 
 167. See LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 8, at 17 (“[M]any directors . . . feel 
they are serving at the pleasure of the CEO-chairman.”). 
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Additionally, because the business judgment rule insulates 
directors from judicial review,168 shareholders should act as a 
check on boards of directors.169 Recognizing this, some courts 
argue that any redress for board failures must come from the 
power of “corporate democracy”—the notion that shareholders, 
if displeased with board action, can simply vote the board 
out.170 However, this power is primarily formalistic and has lit-
tle real impact on corporate policymaking.171 In reality, the cur-
rent proxy process divests shareholders’ voting rights of any 
real weight.172 Because the boards, with little or no shareholder 
input, select the candidates listed in the proxy materials, cor-
porate elections are, effectually, a “rubber stamp” on the 
boards’ choice.173 The outcome is predetermined and rarely in 
question.174 Based on this system, board members are almost 
guaranteed reelection, limiting any damages directors may suf-
fer for failing to act in the shareholders’ best interests.175 The 
reforms contained in Rule 14a-11 will therefore provide teeth to 
the rights shareholders already have, increasing board account-
ability and improving corporate governance. 
B. THE VALIDITY OF RULE 14A-11 UNDER THE APA’S ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD 
Because critics will challenge Rule 14a-11 as arbitrary and 
capricious,176 this section examines three aspects of that argu-
 
 168. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Bebchuk, supra note 76, at 680. 
 170. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If 
the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representa-
tives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board 
out.”); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. 
Ch. 2005) (“The redress for failures that arise from faithful management must 
come from the markets, through the action of shareholders and the free flow of 
capital, and not this Court.”), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 171. See Joo, supra note 9, at 673 (discussing the meager impact share-
holder voting actually has on corporate decisionmaking). 
 172. Rodrigues, supra note 50, at 261–62. 
 173. Fairfax, supra note 61, at 1266. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. at 1267 (“[D]irectors are virtually guaranteed reelection, decreas-
ing their need to be concerned with repercussions for their failure to act in a 
manner that benefits shareholders.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Grundfest, Proposed Proxy Access Rules, supra note 24, at 
373–75 (arguing that Rule 14a-11 is arbitrary and capricious); Jessica Holz & 
Dennis Berman, Investors Gain New Clout, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2010, at A1 
(discussing Commissioner Casey’s criticism: “the SEC fell short in its due dili-
gence to show the benefits of proxy access outweigh its costs”); Jesse 
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ment and analyzes each based on the Supreme Court’s most re-
cent understanding of the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
The first, based on judicial precedent, mandates that the SEC, 
in its release of Rule 14a-11, provide a reasoned basis for the 
Rule.177 Such reasoning must be grounded in “technocratic,  
statutory, or scientifically driven terms.”178 The second and 
third aspects of the argument represent alleged contradictions 
that are each sufficient to invalidate the Rule under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard. In particular, at least one com-
mentator has alleged that the SEC’s efforts to replicate more 
accurately physical shareholders’ meetings179 and its alleged 
stance in the Rule that shareholders are selectively intelli-
gent180 are inherently contradictory and thus invalid under the 
APA.181 
1. Rule 14a-11 and the Lunacy Test 
The Supreme Court has held that to avoid invalidation un-
der arbitrary and capricious review, an agency must satisfy two 
elements. First, the agency must provide relevant data and a 
satisfactory explanation of its purposes for formulating the 
rule.182 Second, sometimes referred to as the “lunacy test,”183 an 
agency must show that there is a “rational connection between 
the facts found and the choice made.”184 In considering this 
element, a court will strike down an agency rule “only if no rea-
sonable person could have written such a rule.”185 In applying 
 
Westbrook, The SEC’s Plan to Pry Open Corporate Boards, BLOOMBERG BUS. 
WK., Aug. 16–29, 2010, at 29, 30 (commenting on the legal challenges that lie 
ahead for Rule 14a-11); Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open 
Meeting to Adopt Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2010/spch082510klc.htm (“I believe that the rule is so fundamentally and fa-
tally flawed that it will have great difficulty surviving judicial scrutiny.”). 
 177. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (2009) (“It 
suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are 
good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better . . . .”). 
 178. Watts, supra note 126, at 5. 
 179. Grundfest, Internal Contradictions, supra note 24, at 2–3. 
 180. Id. at 2. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1810 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 183. See SHAPIRO, supra note 125, at 56. 
 184. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 185. SHAPIRO, supra note 125, at 56. 
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this standard, a court will not substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of the agency.186 
First, the SEC, in its proposed release of Rule 14a-11, ar-
gued that the need for reform to the federal proxy rules has be-
come more apparent in the wake of “one of the most serious 
economic crises of the past century.”187 The financial crisis 
raised significant concerns about whether boards are adequate-
ly monitoring corporate officers.188 In addressing such concerns, 
the SEC noted the inadequacy of shareholders’ existing options 
to implement change.189 Rule 14a-11, the SEC argued, would 
help resolve this dilemma by providing shareholders with “a 
more plausible avenue . . . to participate in the governance of 
their company.”190 
In addition, the SEC offered a significant statistical analy-
sis to support adoption of Rule 14a-11.191 The SEC’s analysis 
emphasized three points. First, the SEC found that boards in 
which shareholders were able to nominate and elect dissident 
directors, but not take control of the board, improved share-
holder value by 19.1 percent.192 Second, it noted that a share-
holder-nominated director on the board increases transparency 
and thus lowers costs associated with capital and trading of the 
firm’s securities.193 Finally, the SEC emphasized that Rule 14a-
11 would lower the direct and indirect costs activist sharehold-
ers would incur in engaging in a proxy contest.194 According to 
 
 186. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1810. 
 187. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 
29,025 (proposed June 18, 2009). 
 188. See Rodrigues, supra note 50, at 255 (“Too often boards of directors 
have proved to be passive spectators, either unwilling or unable to monitor the 
actions of management.”). 
 189. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
29,027–28 (discussing proxy contests, bylaw proposals under Rule 14a-8, and 
the “Wall Street Walk”). 
 190. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,761 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 191. See generally Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. 
Reg. at 29,071–77 (describing the cost-benefit analysis conducted by the SEC). 
 192. Id. at 29,074 n.349 (citing CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., EFFECTIVENESS OF 
HYBRID BOARDS 3 (2009), available at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/IRRC_ 
05_09_EffectiveHybridBoards.pdf ). 
 193. Id. at 29,074. This proposition was supported in a recent study. See 
Christian Leuz & Robert E. Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of In-
creased Disclosure, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 91, 120–21 (Supp. 2000) (finding, in part, 
that firms with greater levels of disclosure statistically and economically gar-
nered greater benefits than firms that did not).  
 194. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,073. 
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a previous study cited by the SEC, a shareholder invoking Rule 
14a-11 would save at least $18,000 by not having to pay for the 
printing and postage needed to wage a proxy contest.195 Thus, 
the SEC, in response to the concerns of inadequate board per-
formance, sufficiently explained itself and justified its explana-
tion with relevant data. 
The second prong of the Court’s arbitrary and capricious 
test requires the SEC to establish a rational connection be-
tween the facts relied upon and its choice of Rule 14a-11 as an 
answer.196 According to the Court, a court would normally re-
gard an agency ruling as arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
relied on factors outside the purview that Congress set for it, 
entirely failed to consider an important facet of the problem, of-
fered an explanation that ran counter to its evidence, or if its 
explanation was wholly implausible.197 
Based on the above guidance, the SEC established a suffi-
ciently rational connection to pass judicial scrutiny under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard. Congress has long under-
stood the SEC’s role under the Exchange Act to make “intelli-
gent adjustments”198 in corporate law that serve to regulate 
“individuals [who] wield the power of thousands.”199 In reaf-
firming the SEC’s mandate, Congress recently provided the 
SEC with the authority to promulgate rules to facilitate share-
holders’ access to corporations’ proxy materials.200 Accordingly, 
Rule 14a-11, the manifestation of Congress’s will in the Dodd-
Frank Act, is within the purview of the SEC’s power as estab-
lished by Congress.201 
Whether the Rule fails to “consider an important aspect of 
the problem” presents a dilemma.202 What, exactly, constitutes 
an important problem? An agency rule may rise or fall based on 
which answer to this question—if there is one at all—a plaintiff 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
 197. Id. 
 198. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 3 (1934) (discussing the need for an agency 
to make adjustments in corporate law pursuant to ever-changing times). 
 199. Id. at 5 (alluding to boards of directors who oversee corporations 
owned by thousands of shareholders). 
 200. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010). 
 201. See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
 202. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
  
2011] SEC RULE 14A-11 AND THE APA 1059 
 
or a judge can conjure in court.203 The case Motor Vehicle Man-
ufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co.,204 however, provides some guidance. In that case, the 
Court ruled that the agency’s rescission of crash protection re-
quirements under federal law was arbitrary and capricious.205 
The Court ruled that the agency’s failure to consider an equally 
effective alternative to the current system in lieu of rescission 
was sufficient to render it invalid under the APA.206 Though an 
agency rule “cannot be found wanting simply because the agen-
cy failed to include every alternative device and thought con-
ceivable by the mind of man,”207 an agency must consider all 
viable and material alternatives related to the existing stand-
ard.208  
Rule 14a-11 satisfies this standard. In its June 2009 pro-
posed rule, the SEC discussed the existing shareholder options 
both within and without the federal proxy system.209 The SEC 
emphasized that shareholder options within the system—bylaw 
proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and withhold-vote cam-
paigns—were insufficient to provide shareholders any real say 
over the nomination process.210 Concerning the former, the 
SEC stated that Rule 14a-8(i)(8) is ineffective because it pre-
cludes bylaw proposals that relate to director elections.211 The 
SEC similarly found that withhold-vote campaigns are equally 
ineffective because of many corporations’ adoption of a plurali-
 
 203. See Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemak-
ing, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 468 (2009). 
 204. 463 U.S. 29. 
 205. Id. at 57. 
 206. Id. at 56 (“By failing to analyze the continuous seatbelts option in its 
own right, the agency has failed to offer the rational connection between facts 
and judgment . . . .”). 
 207. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978) (holding that the Atomic Energy Commission’s con-
sideration of licensing nuclear reactors was not arbitrary and capricious under 
the APA). 
 208. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51 (“But the airbag is more than a policy al-
ternative to the passive restraint Standard; it is a technological alternative 
within the ambit of the existing Standard.”). 
 209. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 
29,027–28 (proposed June 18, 2009). 
 210. Id. at 29,028. 
 211. Id. (discussing the criticisms of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) as a practical tool for 
shareholder participation in the nomination of directors). 
  
1060 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1034 
 
ty-voting system.212 In plurality voting, a candidate can win a 
seat on the board “regardless of whether [she] receive[s] more 
than 50% of the shareholder vote.”213 A candidate, therefore, 
can theoretically be elected to a corporation’s board with a sin-
gle vote.214 Accordingly, withhold-vote campaigns, though ex-
pressing shareholders’ discontent, do not offer shareholders a 
practical mechanism to affect board nomination processes.215  
Similarly, the SEC considered and rejected as impractical 
options outside the federal proxy process.216 The Wall Street 
rule, in particular, is not an optimal solution for shareholders, 
as the selling shareholder will receive no benefit from any poss-
ible improvement in management.217 Moreover, submitting 
nominees directly to the board or nominating a director at a 
shareholder meeting, the SEC argued, are equally ineffective in 
securing shareholders’ ability to nominate directors.218 
Given Congress’s grant of power and that the SEC has es-
tablished a sufficiently rational connection between the facts 
found and its choice of remedy in Rule 14a-11, the Rule will 
likely withstand judicial scrutiny. Concerns still remain, how-
ever, about contradictions within the Rule that would allegedly 
render it arbitrary and capricious. 
 
 212. Id. For a discussion of plurality voting and proxy access, see Vincent 
Falcone, Majority Voting in Director Elections: A Simple, Direct, and Swift So-
lution?, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 844, 847–55. 
 213. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,028. 
 214. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
987, 1010 (2010) (“Under plurality voting, the directors who receive the most 
votes are elected. This means, in effect, that if the number of nominees is 
equal to the number of vacancies—as is the case in the overwhelming majority 
of director elections—every nominee is assured election since it takes only one 
vote to be elected.”). 
 215. Outside of the SEC’s analysis, the ineffectiveness of withhold-vote 
campaigns is well documented. See, e.g., Annalisa Barrett & Beth Young, Ma-
jority of Votes Withheld: Shareholders Say “No,” Boards Say “Yes,” 16 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, July–Aug. 2008, at 6, 6. 
 216. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
29,028. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (referencing boards’ general unwillingness to include shareholder 
nominated directors on the company’s proxy statement and the futility, given 
the near universal use of proxy voting, of nominating a director at a share-
holder meeting). 
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2. The SEC’s Attempt to Better Replicate the Physical 
Shareholder Meeting 
In Rule 14a-11, the SEC asserts that a function of the fed-
eral proxy rules is to establish a proxy system that as closely as 
possible acts as a replacement for the in-person shareholder 
meeting.219 The SEC found that the two areas that create the 
greatest impediments to shareholders’ rights are the director 
nomination and shareholder proposal processes.220 Accordingly, 
the SEC sought in Rule 14a-11 to “refin[e] the proxy process so 
that it replicates, as nearly as possible, the annual meeting[,] 
. . . given that the proxy process has become the primary way 
for shareholders to learn about the matters to be decided by the 
shareholders and to make their views known to company man-
agement.”221 Rule 14a-11 serves to protect the rights of share-
holders envisioned under state corporate law.222  
However, one commentator has argued that the Rule utter-
ly fails to replicate the annual meeting process.223 According to 
this criticism, the Rule would impose a mandatory, one-size-
fits-all form of proxy access that fails to emulate the current 
annual shareholder meeting or any features of state corporate 
law that govern these meetings.224 Advocates of this view focus 
on the Rule’s supplanting of state corporate law’s bylaw access 
provisions in establishing a “minimum access” regime.225 State 
law, unlike Rule 14a-11, “establishes no minimum standard for 
proxy access in terms of the percentage of shares held or the 
required holding period, and permits the imposition of any law-
ful condition on access.”226 This line of thought, unfortunately, 
misinterprets the SEC’s purpose and reasoning. In doing so, it 
proposes using a machete when, at the very most, a scalpel 
would suffice. 
In 1943, SEC Chairman Ganson Purcell told Congress that 
the SEC works to assure for shareholders “those rights that 
 
 219. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,670 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 220. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,026. 
 221. Id. at 29,025. 
 222. Id. (“In identifying the rights that the proxy process should protect, 
the Commission has sought to take as a touchstone the rights of shareholders 
under state corporate law.”). 
 223. Grundfest, Internal Contradictions, supra note 24, at 7. 
 224. Id. at 7–8. 
 225. E.g., id. at 8. For a more detailed discussion of the “Mandatory Mini-
mum Access Regime,” see notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 226. Grundfest, Internal Contradictions, supra note 24, at 8–9. 
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[they] ha[ve] traditionally had under State law to appear at the 
meeting; to make a proposal; to speak on that proposal at ap-
propriate length; and to have his proposal voted on.”227 The 
dispersion of shareholders’ interests throughout the country, 
Chairman Purcell continued, rendered these rights largely 
meaningless.228 The former practice of a shareholder address-
ing her fellow shareholders at an annual meeting is at an 
end.229 Today, a shareholder “can only address the assembled 
proxies which are lying at the head of the table.”230 Rule 14a-11 
seeks to remedy this by providing a forum, beyond the largely 
ineffectual in-person meeting, in which shareholders can again 
make their voices heard and have their proposals voted on. 
The proponents’ of the alleged contradictions focus on the 
relation between bylaw access proposals and the SEC’s “repli-
cate” language disregards what the SEC is really attempting to 
do in the Rule.231 In its June 2009 proposed rule, the SEC clari-
fied that it seeks to fulfill those rights discussed by Chairman 
Purcell:232 to make a proposal, to speak on that proposal, and to 
have the proposal voted on at the shareholders’ meeting.233 
Thus, the SEC’s effort in Rule 14a-11 to better replicate an ac-
tual in-person shareholder meeting does not result in a contra-
diction that would render it arbitrary and capricious. Instead, 
the Rule simply seeks to provide those rights shareholders have 
traditionally had under state law: to make a proposal, to speak 
on that proposal, and to have that proposal voted on. 
 
 227. Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearing on H.R. 
1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 78th Cong. 172 (1943) (statement of Ganson Purcell, Chairman, 
SEC) [hereinafter Purcell Statement]. 
 228. Id.; see also Rodrigues, supra note 50, at 264 (“Shareholders theoreti-
cally could nominate board candidates at a company’s annual meeting. In al-
most all cases, however, voting will have already been accomplished by proxies 
distributed beforehand, so such a nomination would be little more than an 
empty gesture.”). 
 229. Purcell Statement, supra note 227, at 174. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See, e.g., Grundfest, Internal Contradictions, supra note 24, at 7–9. 
 232. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 
29,025 (proposed June 18, 2009). 
 233. Purcell Statement, supra note 227, at 172. 
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3. Rule 14a-11 and Shareholder Self-Determination 
Rule 14a-11 sets a hard limit on the amount of access 
shareholders may have to a company’s proxy statement.234 The 
Rule only allows a corporate board or even a majority of share-
holders to provide for greater access to a company’s proxy 
statement, and expressly forbids rules allowing for less 
access.235  
This alleged contradiction is predicated on the idea that if 
a basic premise of every proxy access proposal is the assump-
tion that a majority of shareholders are “sufficiently intelligent 
and responsible that they can be relied upon to nominate and 
elect directors” of their own,236 then, assuming that is true, the 
same shareholders should be “sufficiently intelligent and re-
sponsible to define the protocols governing when, how, and to 
whom access is granted.”237 Professor Joseph Grundfest, in a 
comment to the SEC, suggests that there can be no plausible 
argument to justify the contention that the SEC should treat 
shareholders as “selectively intelligent and responsible.”238 
Moreover, he argues that the SEC in Rule 14a-11 provided no 
theoretical or empirical support for such an argument.239 In ef-
fect, the SEC failed to definitively answer the question as to 
whether there is any rational support for the Rule.240 
This alleged contradiction, however, is not sufficiently le-
gally significant under the APA to render Rule 14a-11 arbitrary 
and capricious.241 Plaintiffs have generally only argued that 
agency action is arbitrary and capricious based on an internal 
 
 234. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,668, 56,673 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 
249) (disallowing a company and its shareholders to opt out or alter the appli-
cation of Rule 14a-11); see also Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 
74 Fed. Reg. at 29,031 (“[S]tate law or a company’s governing documents may 
provide for nomination or disclosure rights in addition to those provided pur-
suant to Rule 14a-11 . . . .”). 
 235. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,680 (“[W]e are not persuaded that we should allow our rules to be altered 
by shareholders or boards to the potential detriment of other shareholders.”). 
 236. Grundfest, Internal Contradictions, supra note 24, at 5. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 6. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 
664, 657 (2007) (overruling the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the agency deci-
sion was arbitrary and capricious because it relied “on legally contradictory 
positions”). 
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contradiction in four instances: when the agency (1) has com-
mitted a blatant contradiction between the evidence and the 
conclusion,242 (2) does not include relevant scientific evidence 
that runs counter to its conclusion,243 (3) has changed its mind 
throughout the rulemaking process,244 and (4) has internal le-
gal contradictions.245 At issue here, it appears, is the fourth in-
stance. 
The argument that Rule 14a-11 restricts shareholder self-
determination relies on the contention that there is no credible 
argument that shareholders are selectively intelligent and re-
sponsible.246 However, the SEC’s distinction appears to concern 
issues of policy and not of law. For instance, there is a credible 
argument that a corporation, as a shareholder in particular 
companies, will work for stricter access standards, in order to 
set a precedent for its own company. Any proxy access proposal, 
therefore, would be meaningless. Thus, the argument that the 
SEC is treating shareholders as selectively intelligent and re-
sponsible confuses the SEC’s overarching policy argument with 
an arbitrary distinction.  
Moreover, courts have consistently held that they will 
“uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path 
may reasonably be discerned.”247 Irrespective of the alleged 
contradiction, the SEC makes evident in the Rule that it seeks 
to prevent frustration of shareholders’ free exercise of their vot-
ing rights.248 In light of the current law effectively rendering 
 
 242. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding as arbitrary and capricious an agency conclu-
sion that runs counter to its evidence). 
 243. See, e.g., Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 467 
F.3d 295, 313 (2d Cir. 2006) (ruling that an agency’s failure to include contra-
dictory studies renders the rule arbitrary and capricious). 
 244. See, e.g., Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides v. U.S. EPA, 544 F.3d 1043, 
1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (declaring that internally inconsistent determinations 
made during the decisionmaking process do not render the agency’s final con-
clusions arbitrary and capricious). 
 245. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 657–59 (holding 
that the agency’s conclusions were not based on legally contradictory determi-
nations). 
 246. See Grundfest, Internal Contradictions, supra note 24, at 5–6. 
 247. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-
Best Freight Syst., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). 
 248. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,684 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (“We 
continue to believe that parts of the proxy process may frustrate the exercise 
of shareholders’ rights to nominate and elect directors arising under State law, 
and thereby fail to provide fair corporate suffrage.”). 
  
2011] SEC RULE 14A-11 AND THE APA 1065 
 
shareholders’ voting rights meaningless,249 the SEC copiously 
outlined its rationale for proposing Rule 14a-11.250 Accordingly, 
a court should not hold Rule 14a-11 to be arbitrary and capri-
cious under the APA. 
The barriers to the exercise of shareholder power built into 
modern corporation law and the identifiable benefits associated 
with greater shareholder power both suggest that Rule 14a-11 
is a sensible and appropriate response by the SEC to the status 
quo in U.S. corporate law. Additionally, the SEC, in promulgat-
ing Rule 14a-11, soundly explained its rationale for proposing 
the Rule and, in effect, satisfied the arbitrary and capricious 
standard under the APA. Accordingly, a court should recognize 
Rule 14a-11 for what it is, good administrative rulemaking, and 
rule in its favor. In the alternative, to partially negate the con-
cerns inherent in the argument that Rule 14a-11 impinges on 
shareholders’ self-determination and to foster experimentation 
by shareholders, the SEC should amend and adopt parameters 
within which shareholders could tailor proxy access to a level 
that is appropriate for their respective corporations. 
III.  THE SEC SHOULD FRAME THE PROXY ACCESS 
REQUIREMENTS AS PARAMETERS WITHIN WHICH 
SHAREHOLDERS CAN TAILOR THEIR CORPORATION’S 
ACCESS   
The current federal proxy rules are insufficient for share-
holders to have any real influence on issues of corporate gov-
ernance.251 Rule 14a-11 operates, in many ways, to update an-
tiquated proxy rules that are seemingly based on nineteenth-
century notions of the corporate form.252 In providing access to 
corporations’ proxy statements, the SEC gives teeth to share-
holders’ right of corporate suffrage, long understood to be one of 
 
 249. Purcell Statement, supra note 227, at 172 (“[T]he rights that we are 
endeavoring to assure to the stockholders are those rights that he has tradi-
tionally had under State law . . . . But those rights have been rendered largely 
meaningless through the process of dispersion of security ownership 
through[out] the country.”). 
 250. See supra Part II.B.1 (analyzing Rule 14a-11 under the common-law 
understanding of the arbitrary and capricious standard). 
 251. Rodrigues, supra note 50, at 261 (discussing the predicament of 
shareholders under existing forms of corporate and federal proxy law). 
 252. Cf. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 33, at 2 (“The typical business unit of 
the 19th century was owned by individuals or small groups; was managed by 
them or their appointees; and was, in the main, limited in size by the personal 
wealth of the individuals in control.”). 
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the few fundamental corporate rights shareholders possess.253 
Thus, a court that invalidates Rule 14a-11 as arbitrary and ca-
pricious would serve only to continue the trend of insufficient 
board and management accountability that was epidemic prior 
to the 2007 financial crisis.254 Accordingly, this Note concludes, 
above all else and predicated on the above analysis, that Rule 
14a-11 is simply good administrative lawmaking and should be 
upheld by the courts. 
Nonetheless, some contend that Rule 14a-11 is too inflexi-
ble.255 In particular, some have expressed concern with the 
Rule’s eligibility standards256 and the limitation on the number 
of board members that shareholders may nominate.257 There-
fore, as an alternative to Rule 14a-11 as currently drafted, this 
Part advocates that the SEC should establish parameters with-
in which shareholders could tailor their access standards to the 
particular needs of their individual corporations. These more 
flexible windows would largely negate the alleged internal con-
tradictions set forth above,258 while still providing shareholders 
a guaranteed mode of access to the corporation’s proxy mate-
rials. 
Rule 14a-11 contains at least three universal limitations 
that the SEC should amend to provide shareholders the power 
to tailor access and to alleviate the criticisms commentators 
have lodged against it. First, Rule 14a-11 mandates that, to in-
 
 253. E.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (“[I]t is clear that [shareholders’ right to vote] is critical to the theory 
that legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast 
aggregations of property that they do not own.”). 
 254. See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Government Oversight and Reform, 110th Cong. 12–13 
(2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve 
Board) (admitting dismay at the recklessness shown by market participants 
prior to the financial crisis). 
 255. E.g., Letter from Brett H. McDonnell, Professor of Law, Univ. of Minn. 
Law Sch., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, 4–5 (Aug. 17, 2009), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-257.pdf (explaining why Rule 
14a-11’s inflexibility renders it less than optimal). 
 256. See Letter from Shearman & Sterling LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, SEC, 5–9 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7 
-10-09/s71009-293.pdf (criticizing Rule 14a-11’s eligibility standards). 
 257. See Letter from Brett H. McDonnell to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra 
note 255, at 7 (suggesting that shareholders will vary on the number of direc-
tors that can be nominated using proxy access). 
 258. See Grundfest, Internal Contradictions, supra note 24, at 5–6 (contend-
ing that selectively choosing when to regard shareholders as sufficiently intel-
ligent results in an internal contradiction in the SEC’s rationale for the Rule). 
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voke the Rule, a nominating shareholder or group of nominat-
ing shareholders must own at least three percent “of the voting 
power of the company’s securities that are entitled to be voted 
on” at a shareholder meeting.259 Based upon data provided by 
the SEC, there are few individual shareholders who meet the 
necessary three-percent threshold.260 Though the SEC permits 
the aggregation of ownership interests to satisfy the require-
ment, the reality of dispersed corporate ownership261 renders 
such aggregations unrealistic in many instances. With that in 
mind, shareholders may want a lower ownership threshold. 
Relevant data suggest thresholds of 0.5 percent for large corpo-
rations and even 2.5 percent for smaller companies are equally 
ineffective.262 Contrariwise, although a small minority of 
shareholders would satisfy a higher threshold such as five per-
cent, shareholders may want to allow only aggregations of 
shareholders to invoke Rule 14a-11. It would therefore be sen-
sible for shareholders to institute higher thresholds to foreclose 
all individual shareholders from invoking the Rule. 
An additional consideration is the significant difference in 
ownership between large and small corporations. A large corpo-
ration such as Apple Inc., for instance, had 900,678,473 shares 
of Common Stock outstanding263 and 30,573 shareholders of 
record as of October 16, 2009.264 Accordingly, to invoke Rule 
14a-11 an individual Apple shareholder or group of Apple 
shareholders would need to own at least 27,020,355 shares. In 
contrast, in a small, yet diversified, public corporation with 
hundreds, as opposed to thousands, of shareholders it would be 
much easier for a shareholder to achieve the Rule’s three-
percent threshold. Small companies would arguably therefore 
be exposed to a much greater number of contested elections. 
Consequently, although the SEC has delayed application of 
Rule 14a-11 to smaller reporting companies to “allow those 
 
 259. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,688 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 260. See id. at 56,691 (finding that thirty-three percent of nonaccelerated 
filers (smaller companies) and thirty-two percent of large accelerated filers 
(larger companies) have at least one three percent shareholder). 
 261. See supra Part I.A (discussing the ever-increasing divide and dispersal 
of corporate ownership in the United States). 
 262. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 
29,036 (proposed June 18, 2009) (citing statistics that show that 0.5 percent 
and 2.5 percent thresholds will only be satisfied by at least two shareholders 
ninety-nine percent and seventy-one percent of the time, respectively). 
 263. Apple, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1 (Oct. 27, 2009). 
 264. Id. at 33. 
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companies to observe how the rule operates [and thereby] allow 
them to better prepare for implementation of the rules,”265 the 
SEC should, as in its proposed rule,266 establish a rule that rec-
ognizes the differences between small and large corporations. 
Accordingly, the SEC should adopt an ownership threshold 
window of 0.5 percent to ten percent. The low 0.5-percent 
threshold would, in the case of a large corporation, allow at 
least some individual shareholders to qualify under the Rule.267 
The high ten-percent threshold, by contrast, would greatly limit 
the number of individual shareholders, and groups of share-
holders in large corporations, from being able to invoke Rule 
14a-11.268 In short, this window would allow shareholders the 
greatest degree of latitude while still instituting a mandatory 
access regime.269 
Second, the SEC compels a shareholder seeking to call 
upon Rule 14a-11 to “have held the qualifying amount of secur-
ities continuously for at least three years as of the date the 
nominating shareholder or group submits notice of its intent to 
use Rule 14a-11.”270 This includes each member of a sharehold-
er group seeking to aggregate his ownership interests to meet 
the requisite ownership threshold.271 For individual sharehold-
ers, data suggest that, at least in the broader exchange and 
over-the-counter markets, the average investor holds stock for 
less than twenty-two months.272 Institutional investors, notably 
hedge funds, typically have holding periods of approximately 
 
 265. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,687 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 266. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
29,035–37 (outlining tiered ownership thresholds based on whether the com-
pany is a large accelerated filer or a nonaccelerated filer). 
 267. See id. at 29,036 (“99% of large accelerated filers [as defined in Ex-
change Act Rule 12b-2] have two or more shareholders that each have held at 
least 0.5% of the shares outstanding . . . .”). 
 268. Cf. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,691 (noting that only twenty-two percent of nonaccelerated filers and sixteen 
percent of large accelerated filers have at least one five percent shareholder). 
 269. Though outside the scope of this Note, a further consideration is that a 
group of shareholders meaning to aggregate their shares that reach beyond 
the five percent ownership threshold are required to file a Form 13D with the 
SEC, or risk a lawsuit. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006). 
 270. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,675. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Mar-
ket Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 665 (1995); cf. id. at 
621 (finding that an average investor holds shares listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange for less than eight months). 
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one year.273 Thus, under the current form of Rule 14a-11, most 
individual shareholders, and many institutional investors, 
would not satisfy the requisite holding period. With regard to 
institutional investors, although there is some evidence that 
hedge funds, in particular, achieve significant benefits for 
shareholders when acting as institutional investors,274 evidence 
with regard to mutual funds and pension funds suggests quite 
the opposite.275 To preclude many institutional investors from 
being able to satisfy the Rule individually, smaller sharehold-
ers may prefer longer holding periods. Further, a number of 
commentators have similarly argued that shorter holding pe-
riods would encourage shareholders with a short-term focus to 
take advantage of the Rule and thereby divert company re-
sources away from the company’s long-term interests.276 There-
fore, the SEC, these comments argued, should adopt longer 
holding periods to offset such adverse consequences. Converse-
ly, some institutional investors would prefer shorter holding 
periods. Thus, the SEC should adopt a window of one year to 
five years for shareholders to determine what works best for 
their particular corporation. 
Finally, Rule 14a-11 states that a company “will not be re-
quired to include more than one shareholder nominee, or a 
number of nominees that represents up to 25% of the compa-
ny’s board of directors, whichever is greater.”277 The SEC rea-
 
 273. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1731 (2009); E-mail from Cary Klafter, Vice 
President, Legal & Gov’t Affairs, Intel Corp., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 
(June 10, 2003, 18:26 EST), reprinted in John F. Olson et al., Recent Develop-
ments in Federal Securities Regulation of Corporate Finance, in ALI-ABA 
COURSE OF STUDY: POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, 
SJ014 ALI-ABA 1, 225–28 (2003) (commenting that data suggest that institu-
tional investors’ average holding periods are eleven months).  
 274. Brav et al., supra note 273, at 1730. 
 275. See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Share-
holder Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 69 (2007) 
(concluding that institutional investors’ primary motives have been to enhance 
the value of their own investments). 
 276. E.g., Letter from Ursula M. Burns, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, 
Xerox Corp., to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 1–3 (Aug. 23, 2010), available 
at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-700.pdf; Letter from Frederick W. 
Smith, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, FedEx Corp., to Mary L. Schapiro, 
Chairman, SEC 2–3 (Aug. 20, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7 
-10-09/s71009-698.pdf; Letter from James R. Young, Chairman, President & 
Chief Exec. Officer, Union Pac. Corp., to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 2 
(Aug. 20, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-696.pdf. 
 277. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,675 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
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sons that efforts by a shareholder or group of shareholders to 
take control of a board or even gain more than a limited num-
ber of seats should not be funded with corporate assets.278 On 
the other hand, because shareholders technically own the cor-
poration, it is reasonable that they should determine when and 
if board control should change hands.279 However, a rule that 
would permit shareholders to upend a majority of the board 
would likely lead to endlessly contested elections, resulting in 
the inefficient expenditure of funds and ineffective board ac-
tion.280 Accordingly, the SEC should adopt a rule that allows 
shareholders to tailor the change-of-power provision to any-
where from one shareholder director to a number of candidates 
for the board just shy of a majority, thereby eliminating fears 
about a rule that permits shareholders to take control of the 
majority of the board. 
  CONCLUSION   
In proposing Rule 14a-11, the SEC provided shareholders 
with a mechanism to wield greater influence over the directors 
they elect and the companies they own. The Rule unlocks cor-
porations’ proxy statements to shareholders so they can nomi-
nate their own candidates for the board. As a consequence, 
Rule 14a-11 effectively ends boards of directors’ monopoly over 
the director nomination process. It is likely, though, that the 
Rule will be challenged under the APA’s arbitrary and capri-
cious standard. 
The judiciary should hold that the Rule, in its present 
form, is not arbitrary and capricious under the APA. However, 
there is an alternative to the current Rule that also works to 
bridge the divide between shareholder and board power. The 
alternative achieves the same result and fosters experimenta-
tion in shareholder proxy access, thus allowing corporate 
shareholders to tailor access to the needs of their individual 
corporation. Either alternative, however, represents a substan-
tial and positive step away from the boards of directors’ mono-
poly over the director nomination process in U.S. corporations. 
 
 278. Id. at 56,707.  
 279. Cf. Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 850–61 (contending that shareholders 
should have more power to set the rules in certain matters of corporate govern-
ance). 
 280. Letter from Brett H. McDonnell to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 
255, at 5 (commenting that a rule should not be too easy, or else it may lead to 
too many costly contested elections). 
